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ABSTRACT 
Setelah beberapa dekade menganut system pemerintahan tersentralisasi, Indonesia 
merubah system pemerintahan menjadi desentralisasi tahun 2001. Untuk mengidentifikasi 
berbagai kelemahan dalam kebijakan tersebut, paper ini menganalisis pengalaman 3 tahun 
pertama era desentralisasi di Lombok tengah, NTB. Lombok Tengah termasuk daerah yang 
miskin. Fokus analisis pada perencanaan pembangunan, anggaran, dan perubahan 
organisasi pemerintah daerah. Disamping banyaknya inovasi didaerah, praktek-praktek 
seperti masa sebelum desentralisasi masih ditemukan. Ketiadaan koordinasi dan 
keterkatian perencanaan pembangunan secara vertical dan horizontal merupakan masalah 
besar. Disamping itu, beberapa kegiatan pusat di daerah menyebakan berkurangnya 
inisiatif daerah. Pemerintah, pembuat kebijakan, harus memahami bahwa desentralisasi 
yang efektif memerlukan institusi yang secara aktif mengkoordinasi dan memberi peluang 
konsultasi antara berbagai level pemerintahan. 
Keywords: Desentralisasi, Inovasi Daerah, Perencanaan Pembangunan, Anggaran dan 
Organisasi Pemerintah Daerah, Lombok Tengah 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Three years have passed since Indonesia 
initiated an ambitious decentralization 
program. Enormous difficulties in maintaining 
national integrity motivated the new 
government, led by President Habibie, who 
succeeded the ‘New Order’ Soeharto in 1998, 
to decentralize government to obtain broad 
political support from regions. Two key laws, 
the regional government law (UU No. 
22/1999) and the fiscal decentralization law 
(UU No. 25/1999), were passed by the 
parliament in 1999. These laws required that, 
within one year of approval, all 
implementation regulations were to be 
prepared, and the laws implemented from 
fiscal year (FY) 2001. However, because of the 
extraordinary political situation, the 
Government of Indonesia (the Government) 
failed to prepare the required implementation 
regulations before the deadline, and the laws 
came into effect in FY2001.  
The decentralization program targeted 
more than 300 local governments (Kabupaten 
or Kota).
1
 The hierarchical relationship 
between provincial and local governments was 
eliminated, and considerable powers were 
delegated to local governments. Provinces act 
autonomously, but retain hierarchical 
relationships with the central government. The 
election of local government heads (Bupati or 
Walikota) no longer requires approval by 
                                                 
1  In this paper, the term ‘local government’ is used to 
refer to municipalities (Kota) and districts (Kabupaten), 
while the term ‘regional government’ is applied to both 
provincial and local governments. 
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higher authorities, and they are accountable 
only to local parliament (DPRD). As part of 
the decentralization process, nearly two million 
central civil servants were transferred to the 
regional governments. Intergovernmental fiscal 
relations were significantly restructured and 
expanded in the context of decentralization. 
Two key central transfers, subsidies to regions 
(SDO) and presidential instructions (INPRES), 
were eliminated and combined into a 
discretionary grant known as the general 
allocation fund (DAU). The scope for revenue 
sharing was expanded to personal income tax 
and natural resource revenues from traditional 
property taxes. In addition, a special allocation 
fund (DAK) was introduced as a matching 
grant, and regional tax law was revised to 
strengthen the taxation authority of the regions 
(Alm et. al., 2001; Hofman and Kaiser, 2002; 
Lewis, 2002).  
Before its implementation, there was 
widespread concern about the drastic 
decentralization program. The IMF feared 
macroeconomic instability resulting from 
larger budget deficits at central level. Others 
feared disruptions to local service deliveries 
because of the limited administrative capacity 
of local governments. Despite these concerns, 
the first three years’ experience of Indonesia’s 
decentralization suggests that the radical 
decentralization program started off much 
better than many expected (World Bank, 
2003). There has been no major disruption to 
local public services, and regions, one way or 
another, have come through substantial 
changes following decentralization. The 
central government has gradually brought 
order to the public finances by combining 
control over spending with significant tax 
collection. However, Indonesia’s decentrali-
zation is far from perfect. Regions have faced 
formidable operating challenges, and new 
regulations have brought new problems to the 
regions. It is therefore important to assess 
actual local experiences to identify any major 
weaknesses of the decentralization policy. 
This paper sheds light on the first three 
years’ post-decentralization experience of the 
Central Lombok district (Kabupaten Lombok 
Tengah) in the West Nusa Tenggara (Nusa 
Tenggara Barat or NTB) province. This is one 
of the poorest areas in Indonesia and has 
limited human and natural resources. The 
district has 745,000 people and is divided into 
12 sub-districts (Sub-district), 131 villages 
(Desa), and 991 sub-villages (Dusun or 
Lingkungan). The economy depends heavily 
on the agriculture, which employs about 40 
percent of its workforce. Although the effects 
of the economic crisis were limited, the area 
faces extreme difficulties with developing its 
human resources. Lombok Tengah’s human 
development index (HDI) was ranked 288 out 
of 294 local governments in 1999, and it has 
the lowest HDI in the NTB province.
 
Table 1 Lombok Tengah: Human Development Index (HDI) 
1999 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years) 
Adult Literacy 
Rate 
(%) 
Mean Year of 
Schooling 
(years) 
Real Per Capita 
Expenditures 
(‘000 Rp.) 
HDI HDI Rank 
Lombok Tengah 56.0 64.4 4.3 567.6 51.2 287/294 
NTB Province 57.8 72.8 5.2 565.9 54.2 26/26 
Indonesia 66.2 88.4 6.7 578.8 64.3  
Source: BPS, BAPPENAS and UNDP, (2001) 
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More than 30 percent of the population lives 
below the poverty line. Over the past three 
years, we have conducted field surveys in 
Lombok Tengah, and interviewed various 
stakeholders including local government 
officials, representatives of political parties, 
village heads, researchers, religious and social 
leaders, and non governmental organizations 
(NGOs), about their experiences of 
decentralization. Topics discussed ranged from 
local politics to daily operations of local 
technical bureaus.  
This paper focuses on three key topics: 1) 
local development planning; 2) local budgeting 
and fiscal conditions; and 3) local government 
reorganization. Two key objectives of 
decentralization are to strengthen democracy at 
the local level and to improve service 
provisions by increasing local accountability. 
To make public services delivery more 
responsive to people’s needs, local 
governments should have a clear development 
strategy that fully meets their citizens’ needs. 
Further, the established development priorities 
should be reflected in their budgets. 
Appropriate revenue capacities must be 
assigned to local governments so that they can 
fulfill new expenditure responsibilities. At the 
same time, organizational changes are required 
so that new tasks and functions can be 
performed and the influx of former central 
officials can be incorporated. This paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
development planning process, Section 3 
analyzes budgeting practices and fiscal 
positions, and Section 4 deals with the 
reorganization of organizational structures. 
The final section concludes and summarizes 
the paper. 
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
Lombok Tengah still adopts the traditional 
planning practices, which comprise top-down 
and bottom-up approaches. The top-down 
process, in the past, starts with discussions on 
national policy guidelines (GBHN) at the 
consultative assembly. These are followed by 
the preparation of five-year development plans 
(Repelita, currently known as Propenas), 
strategic development plans of central line 
ministries (Renstra), and annual development 
plans (Repeta). Regional governments are 
mandated to produce their planning 
documents: the Poldas, Propeda, Renstrada, 
and Repetada, each of which corresponds to 
the central planning document. Regional 
governments are supposed to take into account 
national priorities in preparing their develop-
ment plans. By contrast, the bottom-up process 
starts with sub-village meeting (Musbangdus) 
and allows people’s needs and aspirations to be 
identified. Similar consultation processes 
continue at village (Musbangdes), sub-district 
(UDKP), local government (Rakorbang 
Kabupaten), provincial (Rakorbang Propinsi), 
and national (Rakorbangnas) levels. A 
combination of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches seems to ensure a delicate balance 
between top-down priorities and bottom-up 
demands in local development plans. However, 
in reality, local development activities were 
dominated by centrally inspired projects, 
because local citizens were left out of the 
decision-making process and bottom-up 
proposals were filtered out at higher-level 
coordinating meetings. 
Following decentralization, participation in 
civil society has become intensive. In Lombok 
Tengah, many stakeholders expressed 
satisfaction with their deeper involvement. A 
decisive factor in successful community 
involvement is village government reform 
required by the regional government law. 
Before decentralization, there was no 
separation of executive and legislative powers 
at the village level. The village head was the 
chairman of the village assembly (LMD) and 
LMD members were appointed by the village 
head. Moreover, the village community 
resilience board (LKMD), which was, in 
principle, an institution for communicating 
villagers’ needs, was dominated by village 
elites appointed by the village head. 
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Consequently, most project proposal were the 
pet projects of the village head and his or her 
crony elites (Antlöv, 2000). However, since 
decentralization, the village head has been 
responsible to the village representative 
council (BPD), which replaced the LMD, and 
villagers elect BPD members. The BPD is 
authorized to draft village legislation, approve 
the village budget, monitor the village 
government, and propose to local government 
the replacement of the village head. These 
reforms have generated transparency and 
accountability in decision-making at the 
village level.  
Village proposals are forwarded to sub-
district to select priority projects for discussion 
at local government level. In the bottom-up 
planning system, the UDKP is granted the 
same status as other coordinating meetings. 
However, the roles of the UDKP are not 
necessarily clear. Although there is separation 
of powers between the executive and the 
legislature at all levels of government, there is 
no legislative institution at Sub-district level. 
The head of Sub-district (Camat) and its staff 
are all local government employees, and their 
posts rotate regularly. The job (eselon) position 
of the Camat is below that of head of the local 
technical bureau (Dinas), which makes it 
extremely difficult for the Camat to convey the 
bottom-up proposals to local government if 
those proposals contradict the ideas of the 
Dinas. In Lombok Tengah, the Bupati is trying 
to resolve this problem by inviting Camats to 
regular meetings as which they have the same 
status as technical bureau heads. 
Following decentralization, the Rakorbang 
Kabupaten has substantially increased in 
importance, because more bottom-up proposals 
can be conveyed from lower levels and local 
politicians have become more proactive in 
pushing their supporters’ proposals. Various 
parties outside government, such as local 
business people, NGOs, and associations, have 
the opportunity to express their opinions. 
However, although discussion is intensive, its 
focus is not necessarily clear. As mentioned, 
local government is required to produce the 
Polda, Propeda, Renstrada, and Repetada. In 
principle, these documents should be prepared 
in a consistent manner to realize local 
development goals in the Polda. Although 
Lombok Tengah has prepared these 
documents, they lack mutually consistency. In 
particular, it is not easy to find differences 
between the Propeda and Renstrada. In 
principle, the Renstrada provides a short list of 
programs and project activities for each sector 
identified in the Propeda. However, vaguely 
defined development goals in the Propeda 
enable wide interpretations by local executives, 
legislatives, and other stakeholders in pre-
paring the Renstrada, which leads to a failure 
to set clear priorities, timetables, and institu-
tional responsibilities for implementation. A 
key element introduced by decentralization is 
performance-based strategic planning. Local 
governments are required to prepare clear 
indicative targets, detailed costed plans, and 
fiscal perspectives for planning activities. 
However, Lombok Tengah has not yet 
produced indicative targets, and some that 
have been prepared remain qualitative, rather 
than quantitative. A lack of quantitative 
indicators creates difficulties in evaluating the 
effectiveness of development activities. 
In FY2003, the Government circulated a 
Ministry of Home Affairs letter (SE MOHA 
No. 050/987/SJ) to provide general guidelines 
for participatory planning and to specify 
procedures for consultation and participation in 
coordinating meetings. The Rakorbang 
Kabupaten proceeds in three stages: the Pre-
Rakorbang, the Rakorbang, and the Post-
Rakorbang. In the first, heads of Dinas and 
Camats are invited to attend and guidelines for 
development activities are discussed based on 
the local development strategy and shared 
among the participants to facilitate discussion 
at the Rakorbang. The Post-Rakorbang is 
arranged to check that the results of the 
Rakorbang and the local budget for the coming 
fiscal year are consistent with each other. In 
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addition, the circular letter specifies the 
participants to the coordination meetings to 
enable the consideration of a wide range of 
local needs. Lombok Tengah has followed this 
guideline since FY2003. However, a key 
challenge is to incorporate participatory 
mechanisms into local government structures 
through councils and boards representing the 
main sectors. The best examples are the 
Education Boards (Dewan Pendidikan) and 
School Committees (Komite Sekolah), the 
establishments of which were mandated in 
Propenas 2001-2005. These new institutions 
have become active in planning and budgeting 
in Lombok Tengah. 
Another new system is a scoring sheet for 
prioritizing local development proposals. It 
provides a general guide for setting 
quantitative priority rankings for all proposals. 
Indicators include the degree of participation, 
consistency with local development plans, and 
effects on human resources and regional 
development. Since FY2003, Lombok Tengah 
has used a scoring sheet system that follows 
these guidelines. The local planning board 
(Bappeda) has prepared a scoring sheet that 
considers consistency with the development 
strategies of higher levels of governments, 
consistency with the local development 
strategy, costs and benefits of projects, local 
needs and aspirations, and technical evaluation 
by Dinas. Local officials have acknowledged 
that this arrangement might facilitate 
discussion at the Rakorbang and improve its 
transparency. However, our interviews suggest 
that the diversity of views in lower level 
coordinating meetings may result in smaller, 
minimum scale and less beneficial programs 
because externalities across villages and sub-
districts cannot be efficiently exploited. The 
implication is that local technical bureaucrats, 
while respecting bottom-up proposals, may 
need to intervene to make necessary 
adjustments in the planning process. The 
success of the new scoring system depends on 
whether Lombok Tengah can prepare a 
mechanism that can guarantee a balance 
between bottom-up needs and top-down 
intervention. 
Another issue in local development plans 
concerns linkages with higher levels of 
government and neighboring local govern-
ments. Compared with previous planning 
schedules, the circular letter sets an earlier 
planning calendar to increase integration 
between development plans and budgets. 
However, because budgets depend heavily on 
central transfers, earlier planning has made it 
more difficult for Lombok Tengah to consider 
its revenue estimates and central priorities in 
the planning process. For effective planning, 
lower levels of government need budget 
information relating to higher levels of 
government. Otherwise, local development 
plans and budgets may be fragmented and lack 
effective linkages with those of higher levels 
of government. Following decentralization, 
public attention has focused almost completely 
on civil society engagement through the 
bottom-up approach, and reform of the top-
down process has received little attention. 
Even in a decentralized state structure, a top-
down element remains necessary for effective 
linkages between development plans and 
budgets at all levels of government. It is 
important for policy makers to recognize that 
the key challenge is achieving the right balance 
between bottom-up and top-down elements. In 
this context, we also note that Dinas currently 
face serious difficulties in coordinating with 
neighboring local governments; such 
coordination is needed to internalize spill over 
effects in local service deliveries. The lack of 
vertical and horizontal linkages in local 
planning and budgeting presents a daunting 
challenge to Indonesia’s decentralization 
program (Usui and Armida Alisjahbana, 2003).  
In parallel with continuing efforts to 
establish a new planning practice, Lombok 
Tengah has introduced greater discretion at 
lower levels of government with regard to 
expenditure by allocating a discretionary grant 
(DAU Desa). Although the new grant must be 
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allocated to routine and development activities 
at rates of 40 and 60 percent, respectively, 
allocation within each category is determined 
at its own discretion. The amounts allocated to 
each village increased to Rp. 50 million in 
FY2003 from Rp. 10 million in FY2001. Each 
Sub-district received Rp. 250 million in 
FY2003 to support priority projects at the 
village level. 
LOCAL BUDGETING AND THE FISCAL 
POSITION 
The Budgeting Process 
Local governments have long followed a 
MOHA manual (the Regional Financial 
Administration Manual 1980), which regulates 
preparation of the budget, treasury adminis-
tration, accounting, and reporting. Under 
decentralization, there have been no guidelines 
for local budgeting and financial management. 
However, decentralization laws require local 
governments to adopt performance budgeting 
and prepare their own financial management 
systems. It was not until July 2002 that MOHA 
released a ministerial decree (Kepmen No. 
29/2002) outlining the structure of the regional 
budget, preparation of the budget, and approval 
processes. It includes directives on the 
budgeting calendar, the budget revision 
process, financial management, accounting 
principles, and reporting and accountability 
issues.  
Because of the delayed release of the new 
guidelines, Lombok Tengah still uses the old 
budget formats and follows old budgeting 
practices (line items and incremental 
budgeting). From July to September, each 
spending unit formulates a budget team (Tim 
Anggaran) and draws up its budget for both 
routine and development expenses. These 
proposals are submitted to an executive budget 
team (Komite Anggaran), which comprises the 
Secretary of the Region (Sekda), the Finance 
Bureau (Bagian Keuangan), the Planning 
Agency (Bappeda), the Revenue Office 
(Dispenda), and the chiefs of the spending 
units. Traditionally, Bagian Keuangan (for the 
routine budget) and Bappeda (for the 
development budget) have dominated this 
process. Simultaneously, the Dispenda 
prepares revenue forecasts. In October, the 
team starts reviewing the revenue estimates 
and budget proposals from each unit to finalize 
the local budget proposal. In the process, a 
couple of bilateral meetings are held with the 
spending units to discuss the details of their 
proposals. In theory, local demands are 
incorporated into the budget proposal based on 
discussion at the Rakorbang that is held in 
parallel with the budgeting process. Once the 
final budget proposal is approved by the 
Bupati, it is submitted to DPRD, as an annual 
budget proposal (RAPBD), in October or 
November. The DPRD budget team (Komisi 
C) leads the discussion and is authorized to 
make amendments to the proposal. Local 
budget (APBD) is to be finalized by the DPRD 
in December.  
Budgeting is the most effective tool to 
realize local needs and the priorities 
established in local development plans. In 
theory, the annual budget should be based on 
the Repetada, which reflects the key strategies 
of the Renstrada. In practice, we found there 
are rarely strong linkages between budgets and 
development plans. The present annual 
consultation exercise may make this problem 
worse. As mentioned, coordination meetings 
are held annually at all levels of government, 
with discussions being dominated by issues of 
development strategy and the budget for the 
coming fiscal year. The annual nature of 
consultation tends to lead to short-term local 
planning and budgeting. Although medium-
term strategic planning and performance target 
were meant to accompany decentralization in 
theory, annual local budgets tend to be based 
the availability of funds. Project selection is 
based mainly on ad hoc factors (such as the 
results of the Rakorbang and bilateral 
negotiations within local government) rather 
than on medium-term development priorities. 
Further, they fail to consider the potential 
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effects of current projects on expenditures in 
subsequent years, and local officials in 
Lombok Tengah who have tried to make 
budget allocation consistent with strategic 
priorities have made many complaints about 
DPRD interventions. Evidently, DPRD 
members intervened for the sake of their own 
interests and disregarded the local priorities. If 
development goals in the planning documents 
are vaguely defined, differences in 
interpretation among DPRD members arise in 
their discussions on RAPBD. 
Uncertainty about the level of central 
transfers, which are still the main source of 
local revenue, remains a problem following 
decentralization. In discussing RAPBD, 
Komite Anggaran reviews revenue forecasts 
before assessing expenditure proposals. Howe-
ver, in the last three years, the announcement 
of central transfers has been delayed because 
of the late approval of state budgets (APBN). 
Lombok Tengah’s APBD for FY2003 was 
approved by the DPRD in late March 2003, 
three months into the fiscal year, because 
APBN was passed at central level in early 
December 2002. Late approval of the budget 
risks inefficient resource management by 
delaying the implementation of programs and 
projects. This problem is exacerbated by 
delayed disbursement of central transfers, 
particularly shared revenues from natural 
resources, at the budget implementation stage. 
In FY2001, shared revenues from natural 
resources were disbursed at a very late stage 
and, according to local officials, were 
delivered after the end of the fiscal year. As a 
result, Lombok Tengah was forced to carry 
over most of the revenues received into the 
following fiscal year (Usui and Armida 
Alisjahbana, 2003). 
Lombok Tengah faces extreme difficulties 
in obtaining information on central DIP 
budgets, or ‘deconcentration’ funds, which are 
included in APBN as central line ministries’ 
development budgets for the regions. Central 
line ministries still control development funds 
to regions, even though the fiscal decentra-
lization law stipulates that all decentralized 
functions must be financed and managed 
through APBDs.
2
 Because the funds are 
distributed directly to the respective local 
technical bureaus via the provinces, even the 
Bappeda, which has primary responsibility for 
local planning and the development budget, 
cannot easily obtain this information. This 
fragmentation of local development activities 
according to the source of funds makes 
efficient budget allocation difficult at the local 
level. The Bappeda contacts the technical 
bureaus and the provincial Bappeda to obtain 
the information. However, the required 
information has not been obtained even after 
the DPRD has approved the APBD.  
The Dispenda, which is responsible for all 
local revenues, has long used the ‘target 
system’ in administering local revenues. In this 
system, a target is set for each revenue item. 
Lombok Tengah still uses this system 
following decentralization. Dispenda officials 
have acknowledged that their revenue 
projections are based on outcomes in the 
previous year (allowing for inflation of usually 
10 percent), which have nothing to do with 
actual revenue generating potential. This target 
system also has a negative effect on local 
revenue mobilization, because there is no 
incentive for Dispenda officials to collect 
revenues that exceed the targets because larger 
revenues imply higher targets in the next fiscal 
year. The same problem arises with 
expenditures. Major routine expenditure items 
such as utilities, supplies, and rents are 
estimated from current prices with an 
allowance for inflation. 
                                                 
2  Hofman and Kaiser (2002) shows that central 
development budgets for FY2002 still allocate as much 
as Rp. 10-20 trillion to financing devolved functions to 
regions. This large DIP budget reflects the 
unwillingness of central line ministries to relinquish 
control of development funds to regions. In principle, 
the DIP mechanism should be phased out and the 
available funds transferred to the DAK. 
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To implement performance budgeting, 
local governments must be fully aware of their 
obligatory functions (KWs) and the minimum 
service standards (SPMs) they need to achieve. 
Quantitative, not qualitative, indicative targets 
that are based on SPMs should be prepared. 
Furthermore, carefully estimated unit costs for 
each SPM must be estimated for each sector. 
However, Indonesia’s decentralization was 
implemented without clear expenditure assign-
ments, and local governments’ responsibilities 
are vaguely defined.
3
 In Lombok Tengah, 
major Dinas such as education, health, and 
agriculture have been applying national 
standards and unit costs, adjusted for inflation, 
which were provided by the central 
government, before decentralization. 
Kepmen No. 29/2002 outlines three key 
features of local budgeting: 1) departure from 
traditional routine and development budget 
approach to a program based approach (unified 
budgeting); 2) changing to a new budget 
structure comprising revenue, expenditure, and 
financing components; and 3) clarifying 
budget estimates based on line-item budgeting. 
The old methods still dominate budgeting 
practices and there is growing concern over the 
timetable for implementation. This is because 
the decree stipulates that the new budget 
systems form the basis for the FY2003 budget 
preparations. Lombok Tengah has adopted the 
new budget format since FY2003. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that it has 
shifted to performance based budgeting, 
because it has yet to prepare quantitative 
targets. 
                                                 
3  Decentralization laws and regulations define the roles of 
regional governments only in general terms: local 
governments take primary responsibility for public 
works, health, education, agriculture, communication, 
industry and trade, investment, environment, land 
matters, cooperatives, and human resources, while 
provincial government plays a coordinating role. These 
vaguely defined expenditure responsibilities have 
caused considerable confusion over the demarcation of 
authority at both the central and regional levels.  
Local Budgets 
Since decentralization, total revenues in 
Lombok Tengah have approximately doubled, 
and most of this increase has come from DAU 
payments. Even after decentralization, more 
than 90 percent of Lombok Tengah’s revenue 
is from central government transfers. It admits 
of no dispute that a high dependence on central 
transfers has negative implications for local 
accountability on the grounds that linkages 
between the costs and benefits of public 
services are lacking. On the other hand, less 
than five percent of revenues are locally 
generated revenues (PAD). In general, PAD 
consists of local taxes, user charges and levies, 
profits from local enterprises, and other local 
revenues. In FY2002, local taxes accounted for 
32 percent of total PAD, and user charges and 
levies 23 percent. There are six local taxes, 
with two (the hotel and restaurant tax and the 
streetlight tax) accounting for about 75 percent 
of total tax revenues. Of the revenues raised 
from the 16 user charges and levies, about 80 
percent comes from health services, the 
identification card, market fee, and local 
products. 
To increase PAD, the health bureau raised 
the tariff for rural clinics (Puskesmas), which 
are the greatest source of non-tax PAD 
revenues. Further, Lombok Tengah is 
considering introducing new taxes or levies on 
business licenses, livestock cards, diving 
activity, and fishing. However, a subject 
claims our attention is the introduction of 
‘inter-island commodity trade tax’. The new 
local tax law (UU No. 34/2000) allows local 
governments to create new taxes, if it meets 
some criteria and has central government 
approval. In FY2001, Lombok Tengah 
introduced this tax in coordination with three 
neighboring local governments (Lombok 
Timur, Kota Mataram, and Lombok Barat).
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Table 2 Summary of Lombok Tengah Budgets 
 (Rp. billion) Before Decentralization After Decentralization 
 FY99/00 FY2000# 
Ave. 
Share (%) 
FY2001 FY2002 
Ave. Share 
(%) 
Revenues 101  119  100.0  231  265  100.0  
   Previous Year's Surplus 1  3  1.8  5  14  3.9  
   Local Gov. Genuine Receipt 4  5  4.1  7  12  4.2  
   Balanced Funds 96  112  94.6  219  235  91.9  
Tax Sharing 3  3  2.7  10  8  3.9  
Non-Tax Sharing 0  2  0.8  5  6  2.4  
DAU/(SDO until FY2000) 65  81  66.2  204  221  85.9  
DAK/(INPRES until FY2000) 28  25  24.4  0  0  0.0  
   Local Gov. Borrowing 0  0  0.0  0  0  0.0  
   Others 0  0  0.0  0  0  0.0  
Expenditures 101  119  100.0  231  265  100.0  
Routine Expenditure 71  90  73.0  160  174  67.7  
Personnel Expenditure 64  80  65.3  136  152  58.1  
Non-Personnel Expenditure 7  10  7.7  24  22  9.3  
Development Expenditure 30  29  27.0  71  90  32.3  
Note: # annualized. 
Source: APBD Lombok Tengah. 
 
The main targets are raw materials and 
agricultural commodities, and the tax rate is set 
at five percent of the basic prices determined 
by the local governments. Local officials 
acknowledged that the tax, which has been 
eliminated under UU No. 18/1997, was 
reintroduced following decentralization. More 
than one year after Lombok Tengah submitted 
the new tax proposal to the central 
government, it received letters from both the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MOHA 
requesting its cancellation.
4
 In response, 
Lombok Tengah and the other three local 
governments sent two letters to the central 
government requesting reasons for the 
                                                 
4  Under the new local tax law (UU 34/2000), local 
government is obliged to submit new tax proposals to 
the central government at least 15 days after its 
approval by local parliament, and the central 
government must finalize its evaluation within 15 days. 
Because of this approval procedure, the proposed tax, 
even if it contravenes the tax criteria, can automatically 
be effective if the central government fails to finalize its 
evaluation by the deadline. 
 
cancellation. Dispenda officials argued that the 
tax did not contravene local tax principles, 
because the commodities on which it was to be 
levied were not subject to national value added 
tax. They also insisted that there have been no 
local objections to the tax. The tax is being 
collected in FY2003, because the local tax law 
has not yet been cancelled by the DPRD. 
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At the central level, there has been 
continuous debate on transferring property 
taxes (the land and building tax or PBB, and 
the transfer of land and building tax or 
BPHTB) to local governments to strengthen 
their tax authority (Lewis 2003). These taxes 
are national taxes shared with regional 
governments. Dispenda and Bagian Keuangan 
officials reacted unfavorably to the proposed 
transfer because they expected to bear high 
administration costs. They also argued that the 
transfers would have reduced Lombok 
Tengah’s revenue. Under the current system of 
sharing, after distributing 64.8 percent of PBB 
and 64 percent of BPHTB to the source 
districts, central shares are divided equally 
between all districts irrespective of its 
derivations (with the exception of the 3.5 
percent of PBB
5
). Local governments with 
small tax bases, such as Lombok Tengah, 
derive larger revenues from this lump-sum 
arrangement.
                                                 
5  Although PBB is administered and collected by central 
government, local governments assist in its collection 
by providing information and encouraging local citizens 
to pay the tax. In Lombok Tengah, 12 of the 53 
Dispenda staff work on PBB. The 3.5 percent of PBB is 
distributed to local governments based on their 
attainments of the previous year’s targets.  
Box 1 Taxes on Inter-Island Commodity Trade (Perda No.10/2001) 
 
In introducing this tax, Lombok Tengah government considered two factors: (1) growing 
number of flows of transportation, especially those on the delivery of goods in the form of 
forest yield, sea yield, land yield, livestock and industrial yield as well as natural yields which 
are forwarded from Lombok Tengah so that, for the purpose of ordering, monitoring and 
controlling the delivery, further regulations are required to reactivate weighing station 
(jembatan timbang) and (2) as an attempt to support the real, widespread and accountable 
implementation of regional autonomy, it is required the digging up of sources for local revenue 
from taxes for financing the organization of government and regional development 
 
The grounds and imposition of tariff of this tax is that the selling price of the goods delivery 
among the islands is counted based on the basic price and the amount of tariff of the goods 
delivery is determined as much as five percent of basic price. Basic price for imposition of tax 
was determined together by three districts and one city all over NTB as written in a joint 
decree with two districts of Lombok Barat, Lombok Timur and one city of Mataram (Perda 
No.11/2000, No.15/2001, No.317/2001, and No. 434/2001, regarding the determination of 
basic price for imposition of tax for the inter-island goods delivery. 
 
This joint decree contained details of all commodities, basic price for imposition of tax, and 
types or units as well as the amount of tax. There are six main producing sectors which are 
mentioned in the decree including (a) forest yields; there are eleven types of commodity under 
this sector; (b) forest yield, there are 37 types of commodity; (c) land yield, this covers 63 
types of commodity; (d) cattle/animal, this includes 23 types of commodity, and (e) industrial 
products, this comprises 20 types of commodity, as well as (f) other natural yields, there are 10 
types of commodity. The determination of this joint decree is revised continually, that is it will 
be adapted to the development of the prevailing prices of commodities in the market. 
2004 Usui, Sugiyanto & Awaluddin  
 
319 
319 
 
Table 4. The 2003 DAU Distribution 
 
On the expenditure side, routine budgets 
account for about 70 percent, of which 
personnel expenditures accounts for more than 
80 percent. To finance additional salaries for 
transferred officials, a major part of DAU was 
allocated to personnel expenses. Moreover, in 
the middle of FY2001, the central government 
announced an increase in civil servant salaries 
back dated to January 2001, which worsened 
Lombok Tengah’s financial position. Lombok 
Tengah responded by postponing several 
development projects. Hence, the funds 
initially allocated to projects were diverted to 
increased salary payments. However, since 
Lombok Tengah was eligible to receive 
contingent funds, the project postponements 
were cancelled. Development expenditure’s 
share in FY2001 increased to 31 percent from 
24 percent in FY2000, which represents a 2.5 
fold increase in absolute terms. At least in the 
budgeting stage, there were enough funds for 
development activities, even though local 
officials repeatedly complained of insufficient 
development funds because of the increased 
salaries. The pre-decentralization pattern of the 
sectoral development budget allocation has 
persisted, and the increased availability of 
funds enables greater focus on the trade, 
education, and health. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Adjusting to decentralization requires 
organizational reforms at the local level to 
meet new tasks and functions. The great influx 
of former central civil servants has made the 
reorganization more difficult. Since local 
governments were not allowed to lay off staff, 
they were required to reorganize government 
structures to accommodate the extra 
personnel.
6
 Lombok Tengah received 7,530 
former central civil servants, comprising 6,630 
schoolteachers and 1,170 other staff. In 
FY2001, Lombok Tengah carried out 
reorganization based on the government 
regulation (PP No. 84/2000), which allows 
regional governments much discretion in 
developing their own organizational structures. 
Lombok Tengah is currently comprises: the 
Sekda, 14 local agencies (Dinas), and technical 
institutions (Lembaga Teknis) including three 
Badan and three Kantor. In this reorganization, 
Lombok Tengah created a new institution, the 
KCD (the sub-district office of Dinas) and 
allocated more staff to this institution to 
facilitate absorption of local needs through 
closer communication with constituents. 
Whereas only education and agricultural 
sectors had a KCD in each sub-district before 
decentralization, almost all Dinas have KCDs 
following the reorganization. 
 
[Table 5 around here Karena Panjang 
sebaiknya ditaruh di lampiran saja] 
 
In FY2003, the Government replaced PP 
No. 84/2000 with PP No. 8/2003, which 
provides new guidelines for the organizational 
position of local government units based on a 
                                                 
6  In this context, we note a negative effect of the current 
DAU allocation method on regional civil servant 
management and reorganization. Since FY2002, part of 
DAU has been distributed based on regional wage bills. 
The implication is that larger personnel expenses 
without improvements in efficiency will attract higher 
DAU allocations to such regions. 
scoring system and its maximum numbers (14 
Dinas and eight Lembaga Teknis for each local 
government). Following decentralization, a 
major concern of the Government was that 
regions have created too many organizations, 
and were using a large proportion of their 
revenues for personnel costs while leaving 
little for development activities (GTZ, 2003). 
The concern motivated the new regulation. 
Lombok Tengah has launched reorganization 
again in line with the new regulations. The 
local organization office (BPD) has already 
finished its first scoring exercise for the units. 
This allows only three Dinas to maintain their 
current positions, and implies the downgrading 
of others or mergers with other institutions. 
There are strong complaints at the local level 
that the new regulations ignore local priorities. 
For example, in Lombok Tengah, most people 
depend on agriculture, but it is proposed that 
the farming and husbandry agency be 
downgraded to Kantor.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has analyzed the first three 
years of Lombok Tengah’s post decentra-
lization experience in relation to development 
planning, budgeting, and organizational 
changes. Although several innovations were 
initiated locally, Lombok Tengah still applies 
the old practices to its key operations. 
Although topics covered are selective, the 
problems discussed in this paper, which seem 
common to most of local governments, suggest 
various weaknesses in Indonesia’s decen-
tralization program. The major issues can be 
summarized as follows. 
With decentralization, stakeholder parti-
cipation has intensified because of village 
government reform, which has provided better 
opportunities for villagers to voice their needs 
and control village decisions. The new 
guidelines have further accelerated this change 
since FY2003. However, it is important to 
institutionalize participatory procedures by 
building stakeholder participation in local 
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government structures. An effective example 
of how the performance and accountability of 
local public services can be strengthened is 
stakeholder participation through the 
establishment of Education Boards and School 
Committees. Along with supporting bottom-up 
procedures, the Government must find a more 
effective mechanism for linking local 
development plans and budgets to national 
development objectives. The first requirement 
is the timely flow of budget information to 
local governments. The current systems of 
consultation-based coordination and direct 
control through central line ministry budgets 
are not effective in a decentralized state 
structure. National allocation objectives must 
be carried out by local governments respon-
ding to incentives provided by central grants. 
To this end, the best policy instrument 
available following decentralization is the 
special allocation fund (DAK). However, DAK 
was not operational in the first two years, and 
tests of DAK’s efficacy for some key sectors 
only began in FY2003. Indonesia needs to 
make the best strategic use of DAK to link 
development plans and budgets at all levels of 
government. Provincial government roles need 
to be enhanced so that systematic coordination 
mechanisms among local governments can be 
established. 
Strategic multi-period planning and 
performance budgeting are inseparably linked. 
Local needs and preferences can be met 
through effective budgeting in response to 
established priorities based on people’s 
aspirations. However, Lombok Tengah still 
faces difficulties in establishing local priorities, 
and linkages between development plans 
remain weak, let alone linkages between 
development plans and budgets. Major 
contributing factors include: 1) the delayed 
release of new guidelines for local financial 
management; 2) vague expenditure assign-
ments and the consequent lack of minimum 
service standards (SPMs); and 3) capacity 
constraints of planning and budgeting officials. 
Since output and performance indicators have 
not yet been prepared, it is not possible to 
assess the effectiveness of local budgets. So 
far, the main concern of local governments has 
been compliance with the new budget format. 
The newly introduced inter-island 
commodity trade tax clearly shows a lack of 
understanding of the new local tax law by local 
governments, and reveals a weakness inherent 
in central review procedures of local tax 
proposals. Further socialization efforts of the 
law and an adequate central monitoring system 
are required if the proliferation of nuisance 
taxes is to be avoided. For a possible transfer 
of property taxes, the Government must realize 
that the current lump-sum arrangement to 
redistribute the central share to local 
governments has generated negative local 
perspectives along with their concern for tax 
administration costs. Given that dependence on 
central transfers has negative implications for 
local accountability, local tax authorities 
should be strengthened through the decentra-
lization of these taxes with transitional 
administrative supports from the central 
government. 
To meet its new responsibilities, and 
manage the influx of former central officials, 
Lombok Tengah reorganized in FY2001. New 
branch offices at the Sub-district level were 
established to which staff were allocated. This 
vertical organizational restructuring contrasts 
sharply with other regions, where many new 
Dinas were created simply to absorb trans-
ferred personnel. However, Lombok Tengah 
currently requires further organizational 
change because of the new regulation, which 
applies a ‘one-size-fits-all’ principle on 
maximum numbers of local units and their 
positions without considering regional needs 
and priorities. Local governments should be 
able to use their discretion in preparing their 
organizational structures to meet their needs 
and priorities.  
Our case study of Lombok Tengah 
indicates conclusively that a significant 
weakness of Indonesia’s decentralization 
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policy is that its lacks institutional 
arrangements for intergovernmental coordi-
nation. The Government is required to set up 
channels for local governments to influence 
central decision-making on local affairs. 
Indonesia’s decentralization was politically 
motivated and initiated without regulations for 
its implementation. Since decentralization, the 
Government has introduced various new 
regulations in an ad hoc manner to patch up 
difficulties without consulting sufficiently with 
the regions. Many problems that we have 
identified are due to the lack of consultation 
processes. Decentralization, by its nature, must 
be a lengthy process, and the fulfillment of its 
objectives requires a lengthy process of trial 
and error. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
there have been problems with Indonesia’s 
drastic program in the initial stages. However, 
it is important that the Government carefully 
monitors local government operations and 
fully utilizes local feedback in its decision-
making through effective consultation 
mechanisms. 
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LAMPIRAN 
 
Table 5.  List of Government Agency which received civil worker transfer from central 
government to the Regency of Central Lombok 
No. Government Agency 
Number of Civil 
Worker in Central 
Lombok 
(before the 
implementation of 
regional authonomy) 
Number of 
Civil 
Worker 
Transfer  
Number of Civil 
Worker in 
Central Lombok 
in Current 
1 Regional Planning Secretariat 181 28 209 
2 Office of Supervise 21 14 35 
3 Regional Planning Office 53 11 64 
4 DPRD Secretariat 15 8 23 
5 Office of Nation State & Security 11 6 17 
6 Kan Office of Invesment & Environment 0 15 15 
7 Office of Mine & Energy 21 0 21 
8 Office of Revenue 37 8 45 
9 Office of Social & Man Power 40 23 63 
10 Office of Citizenship/Civil Service & 
Transmigration & Community Development  
32 20 52 
11 Office of Rural Cooperation Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
42 6 48 
12 Office of Industrial & Trade 8 36 44 
13 Office of Tourism 18 14 32 
14 Office of Fishery & Ocean 40 19 59 
15 Office of Communications 30 19 49 
16 Office of Land Administration 2 63 65 
17 Office of Ed. & Culture Central Lombok 
Regency 
45 19 64 
18 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Praya 5 2 7 
19 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Praya Tengah 4 3 7 
20 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Praya Barat 8 1 9 
21 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Praya Barat 
Daya 
0 8 8 
22 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Pujut 7 2 9 
23 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Praya Timur 9 1 10 
24 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Janapria 3 5 8 
25 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Kopang 8 1 9 
26 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Batukliang 6 3 9 
27 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Batukliang 
Utara 
0 8 8 
28 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Pringgarata 9 1 10 
29 KCD. Ed. & Culture Sub-District Jonggat 5 4 9 
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30 Office of Settlement and Areal Infrastructure 
(Kimpraswil) Central Lombok Regency 
75 115 190 
31 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Praya 0 14 14 
32 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Praya Tengah 0 9 9 
33 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Praya Barat 0 8 8 
34 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Praya Barat 
Daya 
0 18 18 
35 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Pujut 0 9 9 
36 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Praya Timur 0 8 8 
37 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Janapria 0 8 8 
38 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Kopang  0 6 6 
39 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Batukliang 0 8 8 
40 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Batukliang 
Utara. 
0 8 8 
41 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Pringgarata  0 6 6 
42 KCD. Kimpraswil Sub-District Jonggat 0 8 8 
43 Office of Agriculture & Livestock Central 
Lombok Regency 
30 21 51 
44 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya 
0 17 17 
45 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Tengah 
0 15 15 
46 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Barat 
0 18 18 
47 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Barat Daya 
0 12 12 
48 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Pujut 
0 15 15 
49 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Timur 
0 17 17 
50 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Janapria 
0 15 15 
51 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Kopang 
0 14 14 
52 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Batukliang 
0 17 17 
53 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Batukliang Utara 
0 8 8 
54 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Pringgarata 
 9 9 
55 KCD. Agriculture & Livestock Sub District 
Praya Jonggat 
0 9 9 
56 Office of Forestry & Estates Central Lombok 
Regency 
35 82 117 
57 KCD Forestry & Estates Sub District Praya 
Barat 
0 4 4 
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58 KCD Forestry & Estates Sub District Praya 
Barat Daya 
0 5 5 
59 KCD Forestry & Estates Sub District Kopang 0 9 9 
60 KCD Forestry & Estates Sub District 
Batukliang Utara 
0 3 3 
61 KCD Forestry & Estates Sub District 
Pringgarata 
0 5 5 
62 Sub District Praya 12 6 18 
63 Sub District Praya Tengah 9 7 16 
64 Sub District Praya Barat 13 1 14 
65 Sub District Praya Barat Daya 9 2 11 
66 Sub District Pujut 19 1 20 
67 Sub District Praya Timur 17 1 18 
68 Sub District Janapria 14 0 14 
69 Sub District Kopang 18 3 21 
70 Sub District Batukliang 15 1 16 
71 Sub District Batukliang Utara 5 2 7 
72 Sub District Pringgarata 13 1 14 
73 Sub District Jonggat 10 7 17 
74 Village Praya 6 3 9 
75 Village Prapen 3 3 6 
76 Village Tiwu Galih 5 0 5 
77 Village Semayan 3 6 9 
78 Village Sesake 4 1 5 
79 Village Jontlak 6 3 9 
80 Village Gegunung 6 3 9 
81 Village Gerantung 3 2 5 
82 Village Leneng 3 4 7 
83 Village Renteng 4 2 6 
84 Village Panji Sari 3 3 6 
85 Village Gonjak 3 3 6 
86 Office of Health Central Lombok Regency 45 11 56 
87 Sub-District Clinic Praya 20 6 26 
88 Sub-District Clinic Aik Mual 14 9 23 
89 Sub-District Clinic Batu Nyala 9 11 20 
90 Sub-District Clinic Pengadang 6 12 18 
91 Sub-District Clinic Penujak 12 15 27 
92 Sub-District Clinic Darek 11 4 15 
93 Sub-District Clinic Mangkung 0 16 16 
94 Sub-District Clinic Sengkol 11 24 35 
95 Sub-District Clinic Kuta 8 6 14 
96 Sub-District Clinic Mujur 15 8 23 
97 Sub-District Clinic Muncan 9 10 19 
98 Sub-District Clinic Kopang 10 15 25 
99 Sub-District Clinic Janapria 9 12 21 
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100 Sub-District Clinic Langko 4 12 16 
101 Sub-District Clinic Mantang 13 8 21 
102 Sub-District Clinic Teratak 14 6 20 
103 Sub-District Clinic Pringgarata 15 7 22 
104 Sub-District Clinic Bonjeruk 16 5 21 
105 Sub-District Clinic Ubung 16 10 26 
106 General Hospital Praya 99 22 121 
107 General Library Praya 1 3 4 
107 Local Drinking Water Corporation (PDAM). 0 5 5 
 Primary School (SD) Teacher & Non Teacher 0 4897 4897 
 Junior Secondary High School (SLTP) & 
Senior Secondary High School (SLTA) Teacher 
and Non Teacher 
0 1463 1463 
 Total 1360 7530 8890 
Notes: KCD is Kantor Cabang Dinas – Sub District Branch Office 
